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This thesis considers the interoperability of recent modeling efforts that apply constrained 
optimization (combined with representations of system function and management) to 
assess and improve the operational resilience of critical infrastructure (CI) systems to 
disruptive events. We implement these mathematical models using the Pyomo 
optimization package, which is built on top of the Python programming language. This 
computational environment provides advantages for data preprocessing and post-
processing, including convenient and efficient methods for manipulating CI network data. 
Moreover, the object-oriented nature of Pyomo creates a natural means for representing 
interdependent CI systems. Specifically, the model for each CI system can be 
implemented as its own object, and the combined model can be implemented as another 
object built from its dependent components. This allows for increased flexibility and 
extensibility beyond previous implementations. We manage the inputs and outputs of the 
models in a way to be able to compare them across studies, obtaining insight on their 
performance, interactions, and effectiveness. This thesis supports a broader effort to build 
a repository of functional CI models enabled from a geospatial user interface and 
connected to a common, backend simulation engine. 
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Earthquakes, floods, typhoons, and climate change, as well as terrorist attacks, 
can cause—and have caused—damage to critical infrastructural (CI) systems. 
Interruptions of energy (electricity, fuel, gas) supply networks or communication (glass-
fiber-optic) networks can be damaging because of our dependence on them. Moreover, a 
disruption in one CI system can have a cascading effect on another CI system because 
these systems are commonly interdependent. Because of the desire for more resilient CI 
systems, there is an ongoing need to develop and apply operational models of 
infrastructure function. 
Unfortunately, previous research and development (R&D) efforts to improve 
infrastructure resilience have been hampered because of a lack of model interoperability, 
a lack of functional realism, sensitivity of real system geography or vulnerability, and/or 
an inability to visualize system behavior in the presence of disruptive events.  
This thesis addresses the interoperability of recent modeling efforts at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) that apply constrained optimization (combined with 
representations of system function and management) to assess and improve the 
operational resilience of CI systems to disruptive events. We implement these 
mathematical models using the Pyomo optimization package, which is built on top of the 
Python programming language. This computational environment provides advantages for 
data preprocessing and post-processing, including convenient and efficient methods for 
manipulating and visualizing CI network data. Moreover, the object-oriented nature of 
Pyomo creates a natural means for representing interdependent CI systems. Specifically, 
the model for each CI system can be implemented as its own object, and the combined 
model can be implemented as another object built from its dependent components. This 
allows for increased flexibility and extensibility beyond previous implementations.  
We consider the behavior of a notional pair of interdependent fuel and electricity 
infrastructure systems. We manage the inputs and outputs of the models in a way to study 
them in isolation or as a combined pair, obtaining insight on their performance, 
 xvi 
interactions, and effectiveness. We validate our results against those from a previous 
study.  
This thesis supports a broader effort to build a repository of functional CI models 
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Earthquakes, floods, typhoons, and climate change, as well as terrorist attacks, 
can and have caused damage to critical infrastructure (CI) systems. Our complex society 
highly relies on these systems, and therefore an effort to make them more resilient to 
natural or human incidents is necessary. Interruptions of energy (electricity, fuel, gas) 
supply networks or communication (glass-fiber-optic) networks are additionally highly 
dependent on each other. Therefore, optimizing usage and structure of one system 
realistically means optimizing the dependent systems appropriately in context. Studies 
dealing with optimizing networks of infrastructure used software to simulate destructive 
events and improve resilience. 
The common concept of operational resilience for a CI system to adapt and to 
maintain its function in the presence of a disruptive event is introduced in “National 
Strategy for Homeland Security” (Homeland Security Council [HSC] 2007), which was 
driven by the Executive Order 13010 establishing the the U.S. President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in 1996. The process led to the Presidential 
Policy Directive 21 (PPD) (White House 2013), and the concept was expanded in the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in December 2013 by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)  
Alderson et al. (2014) describe how to build and solve a sequence of models in 
order to assess and improve the operational resilience of an infrastructure system for 
worst-case disruptions. However, in order to support real decision-makers, these analyses 
require two important features: 
• Functional Realism: The behavior of the model has to be as close as 
possible to the function of a real infrastructure system. For example, a 
model of electric power transmission should reflect the laws of 
electromagnetics (e.g., Kirchhoff’s Laws). 
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• Geographical Realism: CI systems are inherently geospatial. When 
superimposed on a map, they should look as close as possible to a real 
system. 
In practice, however, the use of real infrastructure system data and geography for 
research is often restricted to avoid revealing vulnerabilities to a potential attacker. As a 
result, at the moment there is an inability to share realistic infrastructure models and data, 
and this is hampering research and development (R&D) efforts to improve infrastructure 
resilience. Each study so far is a one-time result, which does not allow teaching, results in 
lost insights after execution and presentation, and sometimes leads to repetition of work. 
Additionally, there are no benchmarks for comparison of standard data sets as model 
inputs, standard functional models, canonical examples of resilience or brittleness, and 
algorithm performance. 
Overcoming these barriers requires that we address several questions: How can 
the inputs and outputs of a CI model be standardized without loss of generality? Is it 
possible to use the result from one model in another to improve the results? Is there a way 
to incorporate different models so that solving them optimizes both models? Is there a 
way to compare two models that analyze the same system and get a measure of 
effectiveness in a way that hints at improving them? 
This thesis considers the interoperability analysis of recent simulations that apply 
constrained optimization (combined with models of system function and management) to 
assess and improve the operational resilience of critical infrastructure systems to 
disruptive events. A goal of this research is to study interactions between models and 
systems and to measure effectiveness of models. 
This thesis focuses on combining the results of resilience analysis of critical 
infrastructure using network models via a set of software solutions that integrate different 
types of models. We manage the inputs and outputs of the models to compare them 
across studies. We implement the results from one model into another using backend 
simulation engines to run optimization on a full-spectrum set of influences. The goal is to 
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build a repository of functional CI models enabled from a geospatial user interface and 
connected to a backend simulation engine (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Integration of real-world behavior rules and operational 
infrastructure models via a single computational simulation engine 
plus visualization and interaction with it via a GUI (from Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Infrastructure Defense [CID] 2013) 
We apply attacker-defender models, as in Alderson et al. (2014), to problems 
involving interconnected infrastructure systems in the spirit of Dixon (2011) and 
following the mathematics developed in Dickenson (2014). We consider a geospatial 
computational platform as in Martin (2014). The results, performance, and usability are 
compared to the onetime results from previous studies. 
The ultimate goal of the research is to create a sandbox for analysis, design, and 
virtual testing of new infrastructure systems and operation that allow what‐if scenarios to 
system responses to disruptive events (e.g., cascading failure behavior) in a context-rich, 
controlled environment for exercises, education, and training on realistic CI systems. The 
hope is that this sandbox serves as a better environment to produce predictions about 
unknown interactions of the grids and to assess resilience for real systems. 
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Chapter II of this thesis provides a brief summary of previous work that has been 
done and shows the possibilities for improvement. Chapter III presents the mathematical 
models we use in our analysis. Chapter IV shows how we integrate interacting models 
into a structured and improved computational environment that enabled the user to 
modify their tests and get their transferable results via a GUI (graphical user interface) 
from a backend server. Chapter V summarizes our contribution and outlines the potential 
for future work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PREVIOUS WORK 
There already exist several models and algorithms to improve networks of 
infrastructure in terms of resilience. The literature on this is large and growing. A 
tremendous amount of work has been done by the Center for Infrastructure Defense 
(CID) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This chapter provides an abbreviated 
review of the work most relevant to this thesis, along with an outline of our contribution. 
The general attacker-defender (AD) and defender-attacker-defender (DAD) 
models for CI are defined in Brown et al. (2006). These models help identify functional 
and important parts of the network and seek a solution to gain resilience by using game 
theory and optimization models. They consider deliberate disruptions of functional 
networks by intelligent adversaries. They assess worst-case effects of multiple 
disruptions to identify the system’s ability to return to a normal state.  
Salmerón et al. (2004, 2009) apply AD models to the electric power system. They 
implement dominant physical rules, like Kirchhoff’s Laws, in a functional network that 
therefore allows realistic predictions of this nontrivial construct.  
AD and DAD models are used to study fuel infrastructure in Alderson et al. 
(2015). For a notional CI system, they use a sequence of models to assess and improve 
operational resilience, which then can be achieved by actions like installing redundant 
components or capacity expansion.  
The basic mathematics and modeling for interdependent infrastructure systems 
were created by Dixon (2011). Dixon first classifies relationships and interdependencies 
in the analysis of effects on CI; he then uses this data in a game-theory AD model to gain 
insight into otherwise unpredictable effects caused by these interactions. Finally, he 
provides mechanisms and procedures to use this on real-world data and shows how to 
give a decision-maker information that he can understand and use with network analysis 
procedures to get low-cost suggestions with a significant improvement in overall cost. 
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Dickenson (2014) expanded the work of Dixon (2011) to a larger application 
modeling interdependent fuel and electric power infrastructures. Dickenson formulates an 
algorithm to analyze dependent electric and fuel infrastructure systems using penalty 
functions to weight the interactions. He solves for the combined behavior of separate 
dependent models and compares the results to those from a single integrated monolithic 
model and finally gives suggestions of further improvements possible.  
Martin (2014) presents a geospatial tool for infrastructure analysis. Martin 
develops a graphical interface to make it easier to input parameters for a minimum cost 
flow network problem. He focuses on the analysis of a fictional CI system, which has a 
geospatially and functionally realistic structure. He uses this tool to evaluate the 
resilience of this fictional system. 
This thesis follows the basic steps for assessing and improving infrastructure 
resilience, as defined by Alderson et al. (2014). Their tutorial shows how to build a 
sequence of models to improve the resilience of CI. Disruptions can be caused by nature 
or human action. They use simplified examples and real-world analogies to clarify the 
impact and the advantages of existing models, to improve the state of being prepared, and 
to enhance new structures. 
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT 
This thesis focuses on optimizing the results of resilience analysis of critical 
infrastructure using network models. In addition, it enables interoperability of the models 
and gives insight into the performance and interactions of given models. The goal is to 
build a repository of functional CI models enabled from a geospatial user interface and 
connected to a backend simulation engine. 
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III. MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
This thesis adopts the fuel and electric networks from Alderson et al. (2014) and 
Salmerón et al. (2004), respectively, to formulate a combined mathematical model as in 
Dickenson (2014) to allow these separate networks to interact in terms of suppliers of one 
system demanding a commodity of the other system. 
A key building block in our analysis is a mathematical construct used by Dixon 
(2011). He connects supply at a node in one network to the flow on an arc in another 
network. As illustrated in Figure 2, flow ijY  on arc (i,j) of infrastructure II depends on a 
flow nijV  from node n of infrastructure network I reaching a specific threshold.  
 
Figure 2.  The requirement of a commodity from infrastructure I by 
infrastructure II (from Dixon 2011). 
Mathematically, this dependence is represented using the following two 
constraints:  
ij ij nijthreshold T V⋅ ≤      (1) 
ij ij ijY u T≤ ⋅       (2) 
ijT  is a binary variable. It is used to determine whether the threshold requirement 
is met. ijT is set to zero when the flow nijV  of the required commodity I is below the 
requirement ijthreshold . ijT  can be set to one only when nijV  is greater than or equal to 
ijthreshold . ijY is the flow in infrastructure II. If ijT is zero, the capacity iju of arc (i,j) is 
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set to zero and no flow ijY  is possible. If ijT is one, then the capacity iju of arc (i,j) is the 
regular upper bound of the flow ijY . 
This setup is used on all dependencies between the electric and the fuel network. 
The networks from Dickenson (2014) are not altered in our analysis to compare results 
and derive insights from the analysis. 
A. SETS, DATA, AND VARIABLES FOR OUR FORMULATIONS 
For completeness and consistency, we present all index sets, data, and variables 
for our formulations, as originally described in Dickenson (2014). 
1. Indices and Index Sets 
n FN∈  nodes in fuel network (alias fi, fj) 
n FD FN∈ ⊆  demand nodes in fuel network 
n FS FN∈ ⊆  supply nodes in fuel network 
FArcs FN FN⊆ ×  arcs in fuel network 
n PN∈  nodes in power network (alias pi, pj) 
n PD PN∈ ⊆  demand nodes in power network 
n PG PN∈ ⊆   generation (supply) nodes in power network 
n PI PN∈ ⊆  bus nodes in power network (where supply = 0) 
PArcs PN PN⊆ ×  arcs in power network 
n PDN PN∈ ⊆  power demand nodes that supply fuel components 
( ), nfi fj PDFA FArcs∈ ⊆  power-dependent fuel arcs: ( ), nfi fj PDFA∈  can carry flow 
if and only if power supply to n PDN∈ exceeds a given 
threshold. 
n FDN FN∈ ⊆   fuel demand nodes that supply power components 
( ), npi pj FDPA PArcs∈ ⊆  fuel-dependent power arcs: ( ), npi pj FDPA∈  can carry 
flow if and only if fuel supply to n FDN∈ exceeds a 
given threshold 
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2. Parameters [Units] 
nFSupply  fuel supply at node n FN∈ [Barrel(bbl)/ hour(hr)]  
nFLdSCost  fuel load shedding cost of demand node n FD∈ [$/bbl]  
fi, fjFArcCost  per-unit cost to move fuel on arc ( ),fi fj [$/bbl]  
fi, fjFArcCap  capacity of fuel on arc ( ),fi fj [bbl/hr]  
nPDem  power demand at node n [Megawatts(MW)]  
pi ,pjPArcCap  power capacity of ( ),pi pj [MW]  

pi ,pjPY  power flow across power arc ( ),pi pj [MW]  
nPThresh  power threshold required by power demand node n PDN∈
[MW]  
nPGenCap  power generator capacity of n PG∈ [MW]  
nPGenCost  power generator cost per MW by node n PG∈ [$/Megawatt-  
  hours (MWh)]  
nPLdSCost  power load shedding cost of node n PD∈  [$/MWh]  
pi,pjPArcRes  resistance of arc ( ),pi pj  [ ]ohms  
pi,pjPArcRea  reactance of arc ( ),pi pj  [ ]ohms  
,pi pjB  susceptance of arc ( ),pi pj  [ ]1 ohms  

fi , fjFY  fixed fuel flow across arc ( ),fi fj  [bbl/hr]  
nFThresh  fuel threshold required by power generation node n FDN∈  
[bbl/hr]  
3. Decision Variables [Units] 
fi, fjFY  flow on fuel arc ( ),i jf f  [bbl/hr]  
nFLdS  load shedding at fuel demand node n FD∈  [bbl/hr]  
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nFT  =






nPGen  power generated at generator node n PG∈  [MW]  
pi,pjPY  flow on power arc ( ),pi pj  [MW]  
nPLdS  load shedding at power demand node n PD∈  [MW]  
nθ  phase angle at power node n PN∈  [ ]radians  
nPT   =






B. FUEL MODEL WITH INTER-DEPENDENCE 
We begin with a formulation for a fuel infrastructure system, whose pumps 
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2. Discussion on Inter-dependence 
Key to the functional inter-dependence are constraints (F3), (F4), and (F6) 
involving the variables nFT . Each nFT  is a switch modeling the interdependence. It is set 
to one if the net electric supply received by demand node n  within the electrical 
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distribution system meets or exceeds the power requirement or threshold, nPThresh . 
Constraint (F3) sets the capacity of an arc of the fuel network to zero or full capacity, if 
the dependence threshold variables nFT  are set to zero or one. Constraint (F4) sets the 
dependence threshold variable nFT  based on the operating conditions in the electric 
system. In this model the nFT  variables are only constrained by the fixed electric flows, 
.pi nPY , from that system. Stipulation (F6) sets the dependence threshold variables, nFT , as 
binary.  
C. ELECTRIC MODEL WITH INTER-DEPENDENCE 
We continue with a formulation for an electricity infrastructure, whose generators 
depend on the energy resources of a separate fuel infrastructure. 
1. Formulation 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
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2. Discussion on Inter-dependence 
Key to the functional inter-dependence are constraints (P5) and (P6) involving the 
variables nPT . Each nPT  is a switch modeling the interdependence. It is set to one, if the 
net fuel supplied to demand node n  in the fuel distribution system meets or exceeds its 
fuel requirement (threshold), nFThresh . Constraint (P5) sets the dependence threshold 
variable nPT  based on the operating conditions in the fuel model. In the fuel model the 
nPT  variables are only constrained by the fixed fuel flows,  fi,nFY , from that system. 
Constraint (P6) sets the capacity of an arc of the electric network to zero or full capacity, 
if the dependence threshold variables nPT  are set to zero or one. 
D. COMBINED MODEL 
We combine the formulations of the electricity infrastructure and the fuel 
infrastructure into a single, integrative model, and convert the flow parameters in the 
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2. Discussion on Inter-dependence 
Constraints (C1) and (C2) model the interdependencies between the two systems. 
Constraints (C1) requires that net supply of electrical power to power demand nodes meet 
or exceed the threshold, nPThresh , to allow fuel flow on the corresponding 
interdependent fuel arc ( ),fi fj . Constraints (C2) requires that net supply of fuel to fuel 
demand nodes meet or exceed the threshold requirement, nFThresh , to allow electric 
flow on the corresponding interdependent power arc ( , )pi pj . 
E. DISCUSSION 
Dickenson (2014) implemented this model using the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS 2015), but his implementation consists of many separate model files (see 
Figure 3) and is not easy to extend or modify. The results from that implementation are 
simple text files with no fixed format, which makes them hard to use in common 
statistical analysis tools like JMP (2015) or R (2015)  
   
Figure 3.  GAMS (.gms) code files necessary to solve the combined model 
and the corresponding input text and comma separated value (.csv) 
files as implemented in Dickenson (2014). 
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Building on Dickenson’s basic implementation, we make several improvements to 
allow extension and modification of the model and allow implementation of different 
solvers and more advanced algorithms. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
A. OUR APPROACH 
Dickenson (2014) demonstrates how two well-understood infrastructure networks 
with established, published, and proven formulations could interact in a GAMS (2015) 
environment. The first one is taken from Alderson et al. (2014), a fuel model with their 
operator formulation. The other is the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers) RTS-96 (Reliability Test System 1996) with the electric model taken from 
Salmerón et al. (2004). The interdependence is modeled using the constructs from Dixon 
(2011). 
We elect to implement these mathematical models using the Pyomo optimization 
package (2015), which has been built on top of the Python programming language 
(2015). There are several reasons for this. First, a Python-based programming 
environment has advantages for data preprocessing, and the availability of libraries, such 
as NetworkX (2015), provide convenient and efficient methods for manipulating CI 
network data. Second, Python supports subroutines, whereas GAMS does not, and 
subroutines are essential for modular algorithm development. Third, the object-oriented 
nature of Pyomo creates a natural means of representing CI systems. Specifically, the 
operator model for each CI system can be implemented as its own object, and the 
combined model can be implemented as another object built from its dependent 
components. This allows for increased flexibility and extensibility beyond similar 
implementations in GAMS. Finally, a Python implementation allows for easier 
integration into other applications, specifically the Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
defined in Martin (2014), which was also implemented in Python. Specifically, we are 
able to connect our models to that GUI via a transfer file using the extensible Markup 
Language (XML) format (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  GUI improves usability as the translation into one program 
language. One type of transfer file that is universally readable 
improves exchange and analysis option of solution sets. 
B. FOCUS 
The goal is to allow a continuous and reusable integration of mathematical models 
and geospatial data into a graphical representation supported by software that is 
extensible and low-cost. This way, all work can be reused, further improvements and 
deeper insights can be gained, and there is no need to reinvent a system or to relearn or 
reprogram already established and proven results when using them on a bigger scale or in 
different model environments. 
C. MILESTONES 
We subdivided the project into three milestones (A, B, and C; see Figure 5). 
Milestone A involves using the logic of Dickenson (2014) for the separate fuel model 
(FM) and electric model (EM) in Python Pyomo. Milestone B involves building a 
combined model (model EM-FM) in an efficient way that produces the same results as 
the original GAMS code. Milestone C involves using the model from the GUI and 
improving further aspects of usability, security, transferability, and efficiency. We 
present results from model FM, model EM, and model FM+EM in three representative 
cases to compare resulting solution network flow and objective. 
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Figure 5.  Milestones A, B, and C and its phases for our translation and 
improvement process. 
1. Milestone A 
Milestone A is a logical model in a Python Pyomo environment that implements 
all necessary logical steps from the FM in GAMS and the EM in GAMS. 
We create a Python subroutine that uses Pyomo to build the FM, which includes 
all sets, all parameters, all variables, all constraints (including dependency constraints), 
and the objective, as defined in Section III.A of this thesis. 
We build on the notional fuel infrastructure, which is introduced in Alderson et al. 
(2015) and shown in Figure 6 as basis for our analysis.  
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Figure 6.  Fuel distribution network model where the black filled circles are 
the supply nodes and the others have fuel demands; the arcs 
represent establish connections between nodes (from Alderson et 
al. 2015). 
We create another Python subroutine that uses Pyomo to build the EM, which 
includes all sets, all parameters, all variables, all constraints (including dependency 
constraints), and the objective, as defined in Section III.A of this thesis. 
Figure 7 shows the electric system. It has 74 total nodes composed of 33 
generator nodes, 17 demand nodes, and 24 bus nodes (from Reliability Test System 




Figure 7.  The IEEE One Area RTS-96 is the basis for the electrical power 
system Salmerón et al. (2004). 
2. Milestone B 
Milestone B is a combined Model (FM+EM) that consists of the two logical 
models and the real data. It allows us to solve the two models separately and in a 
combined manner. 
We create a Python subroutine that uses Pyomo to build the combined logical 
model (FM+EM), which imports logical models FM and EM, defines links between 




Figure 8.  Logical models of fuel model, electric model, and combined model 
and their inclusions. 
We create separate instances for model FM, model EM, and combined model 
FM+EM. This allows us to solve FM alone and to solve EM alone, but also to solve 
FM+EM independent of the single models. 
a. Comparison of Example Used in Dickenson (2014) 
The interaction options are shown in Figure 9 (electric network depends on fuel) 
and Figure 10 (fuel network depends on electricity) and are used in the same manner in 
the analysis of the interdependency study from Dickenson (2014). 
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Figure 9.  RTS-96 positions of fuel dependence (Dickenson 2014) where the 
generator nodes demand fuel supply. The dependency is depicted 
in dashed lines. For example, electric flow on arc (g115,i115) 
depends on fuel from node fn1. 
 
Figure 10.  The Fuel Demand Model positions of electrical power dependency 
(Dickenson 2014) where pumps depend on electricity. The 
dependency is depicted in dashed lines. For example, fuel flow on 
arc (fn10,fn6) depends on electricity from node d103. 
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The next two figures sum up the output and the results from the run of the 
combined model FM+EM in GAMS (see Figure 11) and in Python Pyomo (see Figure 
12). They show the state of the objective values for the separate models after completion 
of the combined run in the structure used by Dickenson (2014). The baseline solutions of 
the three models are EM: 4460.3, FM: 79593.5, and FM+EM: 84053.8. These models use 
the same input files for all implementations. The specific values of flows differ between 
the implementations, but that is caused by the fact that there are multiple optimal 
solutions for the flows. 
 
Figure 11.  Output of flows and results from the base case for model FM+EM 
as implemented in GAMS. 
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Figure 12.  Output of flows and results from the base case for model FM+EM 
as implemented in Python Pyomo. 
b. Comparison of Two Examples of Stress on the Inter-dependency 
We simulate three situations to test the models and verify their results. The first 
one checks the functionality of the implementations, and the following two examples 
show, first, a case in which the GAMS and the Python Pyomo version have to find a 





(1) Case Zero: No Load Shedding Cost 
We set the load shedding cost for both models to zero, as indicated in Table 1. We 
expect a reduction in total cost. We are testing basic functionality of both models with a 
known outcome. 
Table 1.   Load shedding costs in base case and in the test model. 
  
The effect is what we would expect because the optimization for minimal cost 
decides that there is no need to transport or satisfy demands at all. This was a critical 
finding in Dickenson (2014) because the search for an appropriate high penalty for load 
shedding was crucial to gaining realistic results. These results match the two 
implementations and concur with the expected outcomes (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Results of case zero in GAMS and Python models. 
(2) Case One: Electric Generator Out of Order 
In the first example, we assume an electric generator (g118) has malfunctioned 
and produces zero MWh instead of 400, as depicted in Table 2. We expect no influence 
on the FM, but a cost increase in the EM and the FM+EM, because the total power 
demand cannot be satisfied and load shedding cost should occur. We are testing the 
optimization process of both systems with an artificial test and a known, but non-obvious 
solution. 
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Table 2.   Electric generator g118 has capacity of 0 instead of 400 MWh. 
 
 
All three models produce the same optimal results, and the effect is only in the 
EM and the FM+EM models. This test shows that both implementations solve the single 
and the combined model independent from each other. The penalty in EM is equal to the 
penalty in EM+FM because the system is still solvable in the way to avoid an additional 
penalty in the interdependent FM via the optimal routing in the separate EM, which was 
artificially chosen to test the optimization process. These results also match the two 
implementations and concur with the expected outcome tendencies (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Electric generator is not producing energy and causes a 17% 
increase in cost in the EM. 
(3) Case Two: Fuel Arc Broken 
In the second case, we assume a fuel arc (FN8-FN12) is broken and has zero 
capacity instead of 1350 bbl, as depicted in Table 3. We expect an influence on the FM 
because the highest supplier FN8 has to reroute its fuel to satisfy the demands within the 
network. We do not expect an effect on the interdependent electric network because the 
amount of fuel that can be transported has not changed. We are testing the optimization 




Table 3.   Fuel arc FN8-FN12 capacity of 0 instead of 1350 bbl. 
 
 
All three models produce the same optimal results, and the effect is only in FM 
and FM+EM. Every arc in FM has the same capacity and is set so that the highest 
supplier is able to send his product completely over any arc. This test shows that even in 
this comfortable case, the rerouting cost to avoid penalty forms demands within the 
system and penalty from the interdependent system can get relatively high (see Figure 
15). 
 
Figure 15.  Broken fuel arc causes a 26% increase in cost in FM. 
(4) Discussion 
Both GAMS and Python Pyomo models give the same objective values and are 
able to solve the problems in a short amount of time. An evaluation of computation time 
can be performed only with more systems to be compared and with systems with more 
nodes or a higher complexity. Extreme cases occurring in fuel and in electric network on 
dependent nodes cause results represented in both models as intuitively suspected or 
artificially designed to test their reliability in function. 
3. Milestone C 
Milestone C consists of several improvements that seemed necessary in terms of 
usability, security, transferability, and usability of a backend simulation engine.  
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We adapted the GUI originally developed from the Infrastructure Design Editor 
Analyzer (IDEA) project (Johnson and Heine 2015) to work in a Microsoft (2015b). 
Windows 8.1 and therefore future systems. We managed the usage of a single backend 
server system to allow restriction of access to sensitive data.  
We redraw the fuel network Alderson (2014) into the IDEA (Johnson and Heine 
2015; see Figure 16) environment and programmed Python Pyomo (2015) code. This 
model uses a CPLEX (2015) solver but can technically use different solvers by changing 
only a single line of code.  
An additional adaption was to store variations of the solution sets in a reasonable 
manner that, for a specific network, the user is able to switch between different input 
settings and immediately see the visualization on screen while also being able to extract 
the data for use in an arbitrary tool for further analysis or representation (JMP 2015, 
Microsoft 2015a, R 2015). The networks can be created and modified in the IDEA Editor 
(see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16.  Screenshot of the IDEA Editor showing the creation of the basic 
fuel network. 
The interaction between these two networks can now be executed with a single 
click on a “Run Simulation” button after loading them into the GUI. The flows are color 
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coded and can also be varied by the user, as depicted in Figure 17. The results proved to 
be equal to those obtained in Dickenson (2014). 
Figure 17.  Screenshot of the IDEA Analyzers showing a solution for the basic 
fuel network without background in preset color coding for flows 
and the ability to compare results visually and via tables quickly. 
In integration of a Dystopia (Center for Homeland Defense and Security [CHDS] 
2011) network, layers from the provided server worked out well, and an integration of 
real-life data is possible. Figures 18 and 19 show the artificial island of Dystopia with 
rudimentary networks drawn already.  
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Figure 18.  The Dystopia map from the Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security (2015) and its developed networks so far. 
 
Figure 19.  Screenshot of a Dystopia map used by Martin (2014) to show a 
partial network to visualize results to the background. The example 
here is a telecommunications network but is illustrative of the 
ultimate goal to connect models of interdependent CI systems in a 
geographically realistic environment. 
To make integration in the user interface easier, we included a help file and a 
step-by-step example to the IDEA Editor so that the usage of this tool behaves more like 
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any other standard GUI and allows quick access to commonly asked questions and a 
convenient introduction for first-time users. The structure is shown in Figure 20 (without 
the 27 steps of the tutorial). 
 
Figure 20.  The structure of the IDEA Editor help file allows users to take a 




V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Our goal has been to create a user-friendly, adaptable basis for future analysis on 
interdependent CI networks. We accomplish several steps in that process. We replace 
multiple programming language solutions (GAMS, MS Excel, etc.) with a single 
freeware language (Python Pyomo). In the model, we allow any solver to be used and 
show the output with CPLEX. It is now possible to work from anywhere via a server on 
any recent Microsoft Windows system. The distribution of information is now 
controllable due to the backend solution. The intermediate files are reduced from over 
twenty to two and standardized in one globally usable format (XML). We code a 
functional CI fuel model. We code a functional CI electric model. We combine these 
models in a new model. Editing and visualisation via a GUI are now possible. Analysis 
becomes faster, more user-friendly, and in accordance with notional standards. Analysis 
modifications in the GUI are also more user-friendly, and their outcomes are provided in 
transferable files. The final models can be used to improve resilience of networks and 
find vulnerable spots in case of a possible disaster. This way, a blackout or loss of 
communication becomes less likely, and the chance of losing a high amount of human 
life can be reduced. Overall, our contribution allows easier access and faster analysis of 
interdependent CI networks. 
B. CONCLUSION 
We transfer two non-trivial logical network models and their data into a single 
open-source programming language to allow future work to be implemented more easily. 
We make results transferable and enable the user to interact with the models via a GUI 
that gives visual feedback on results and has the opportunity to change settings and 
values quickly. With all the other improvements stated, we found a base for future studies 
that are not one-time results anymore, and we enhanced attractiveness for using it in 
education, research, and presentations.  
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C. FUTURE WORK 
To improve global usage, there is a need to develop models for other networks 
that might interact (e.g., telecommunication or transportation) with realistic behavior and 
a clear dependency link between the systems. 
To improve the usage of our tool, we should expose students of OR, researching 
faculty, managers of CI, and decision-makers of cities/industry/military to the system and 
find out whether the visualization can be improved. We should also create a stack of 
more models and networks to do research and out-of-the-box experiments with the 
networks that are not real but represent the behavior of each system and its interaction in 
a realistic way. 
To improve in terms of user-friendliness, it would be useful to create a tool 
similar to the editor and the analyzer that allows for creating scenarios without the need 
to manually enter every change into the data or the GUI, but rather set up rules to 
influence the network in cases of disruptive events like an earthquake, tsunami, or bomb 
attack, for example, via a separate Scenario Editor GUI (see Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.  Future situation of data organization and applications including the 
Scenario Builder and a library of verified GIS (Geographic 
Information System) data. 
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Because our system allows integration of different algorithms in a convenient 
manner, we recommend testing and exploring different approaches, which is optimal for 
large-scale networks and a higher number of interacting networks. For example, to 
validate the results, a remote and known network of a feasible-sized infrastructure, like 
the electric and fuel power grid of the Hawaiian Islands, could be used in future studies.  
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